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IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE MAY BE
DETERMINED IN THE JURY'S
PRESENCE
Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. 654 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, in Watkins v. Sowders,1 refused to establish a
per se rule that the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence
must be determined outside the jury's presence. Instead, the Court held
that in most cases, 2 this determination may be made before the jury.3
Watkins is the latest in a series of decisions4 which have considerably
weakened the due process requirement that police use non-suggestive
pretrial eyewitness identification procedures.5 After Watkins, the jury
may hear identification evidence which is totally unreliable, and hence
1 101 S. Ct. 654 (1981).
2 Id at 659. The Court did not discuss what, if any, circumstances would require such a
hearing out of the jury's presence. Apparently, the only circumstances which might require
such a hearing would be if the defendant claimed that the identification procedure violated
his sixth amendment right to counsel at lineup identification procedures. This right was first
established in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See discussion at note 62 infra.
3 The Court did recognize that holding such a hearing out of the jury's presence is the
preferable procedure for determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence.
Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. at 657. Before Watkins, at least some authorities believed that
such a hearing was required. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 361 (1980).
4 This trend first became apparent in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). See also Man-
son v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). These cases are discussed in detail at notes 91-101 &
accompanying text infra.
5 This requirement was first established in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Pretrial eyewitness identification procedures include lineups (where the suspect and sev-
eral non-suspects are displayed to the witness); showups (a one-to-one confrontation between
suspect and witness); and photographic identifications (where a photograph of the suspect,
usually along with several photos of non-suspects, are shown to the witness). For a general




inadmissible.6 An instruction to disregard may not erase the impression
such testimony can make upon the ininds of the jury. This indelible
impression could lead to the conviction of many innocent defendants. 7
Moreover, Watkins will not decrease the number of guilty defendants
who are set free, because it does not allow the jury to consider any addi-
tional probative evidence which it could not have considered before this
decision.
This Note will analyze the Court's decision in Watkins, the prior
decisions upon which Watkins was based, and the legal and practical
implications of this decision. It will show that the only new evidence
which Watkizs will allow the trier of fact to hear is unreliable eyewitness
identification evidence. Although Watkins will result in some marginal
time savings for the courts, this efficiency is completely outweighed by
the prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to hear totally unreliable, and
hence irrelevant, evidence.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Watkins v. Sowders was based on two distinct factual situations
which ultimately involved controversy over eyewitness identification
evidence. 8
One situation arose from a January 11, 1975, robbery of a Louis-
ville, Kentucky liquor store.9 At about 11:30 p.m., three or four men 10
entered the store. One of the men announced the hold-up to the clerk,
Walter Smith. Upon hearing this, Donald Goeing, another employee of
the store, turned to face the men. This attracted the attention of the
man who had announced the robbery. He fired two shots at Goeing,
hitting him in the arm and in the heart. The gunman immediately ran
out the door."
6 See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 ("reliability is
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony...').
7 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228-29 n.6 (1967), and studies cited therein, for
instances of convictions based upon mistaken eyewitness identifications.
8 Two cases, Watkins v. Sowders (No. 79-5949), and Summitt v. Sowders (No. 79-595 1),
were consolidated for argument and decision in the United States Supreme Court, as well as
in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
9 Watkins v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1978), aj'd sub nom., Watkins v.
Bordenkircher, No. C78-0241 L(A) (W.D. Ky., Sept. 28, 1978), afd sub nom., Summitt v.
Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979), ajf'dsub noma., Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. 654
(1981).
10 The number of robbers who entered the store is unclear. The United States Supreme
Court reported that four did so, 101 S. Ct. at 656, while the Supreme Court of Kentucky
estimated that "three or four" did. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Ky.
1978).
11 See Watkins v. Bordenkircher, No. C78-0241 L(A) (W.D. Ky., Sept. 28, 1978) (memo-
randum opinion) at 1.
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That night, Smith and Goeing both gave the police verbal descrip-
tions of the gunman. 12 Two days later the police arrested Watkins.' 3
That day they showed Smith a three man lineup which included Wat-
kins14 and two other black men. 15 Although not completely sure at
first, 16 Smith eventually identified Watkins as the gunman. Watkins
was then taken to Goeing's hospital room for a showup, because at that
time it was uncertain whether Goeing would recover from his wounds.' 7
From his bed, Goeing identified Watkins as his assailant.' 8
Both before and during the trial, Watkins' attorney requested that
a hearing be held out of the presence of the jury to determine whether
the identification evidence was admissible. These requests were
denied. 19
At trial, the prosecution relied upon in-court identifications of Wat-
kins made by Smith and Goeing, but did not introduce evidence of the
pretrial identifications.20 Watkins' attorney, however, cross-examined
both witnesses about the circumstances of the pretrial identifications. 21
The trial judge found that all of the identification evidence was admissi-
ble.22 Watkins was found guilty of both robbery and assault, and sen-
tenced to twenty years on each charge. 23 The Supreme Court of
12 Goeing described the gunman as a young black male with a light complexion. Smith
described him as a light skinned black man about thirty to thirty-five years old, and approxi-
mately five feet, nine inches tall. See Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247, 249 (6th Cir.
1979).
13 Petitioner's Brief at 5, Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. 654 (1981).
14 Since this lineup occurred before Watkins had been arraigned, id, Watkins did not
have the right to the presence of an attorney at his lineup. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972).
15 Both non-suspects in the lineup had darker complexions than Watkins, although
neither had a particularly dark complexion. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 249.
16 See id Smith testified that he was not completely sure of his identification of Watkins
during the lineup, but when he "got himself together" he was sure that Watkins was the
gunman. Watkins v. Bordenkircher, No. C78-0241 L(A) (W.D. Ky., Sept. 28, 1978), at 2.
17 Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. at 656.
18 Although at the same time Goeing stated that "it could have been close enough that it
could have been his twin brother, it could have been somebody else." Summitt v.
Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 249.
19 A written motion for a suppression hearing on the identification testimony was initially
submitted before trial. That motion was denied. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d at
630. Before any evidence was heard, Watkins' attorney again moved for a hearing out of the
presence of the jury; this motion was also denied. Id Before Smith or Goeing testified, de-
fense counsel objected to the denial of an in camera hearing on the admissibility of the identi-
fication evidence, but was overruled. Id
20 101 S. Ct. at 656.
21 Watkins' attorney also cross-examined one of the officers present at the hospital room
showup about the circumstances of that identification. Id
22 The trial judge denied Watkins' motion for a mistrial based upon the introduction of
the identification evidence. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 249.
23 Kentucky v. Watkins, No. 153965 (Jefferson County, Ky., Circuit Court, July 15, 1977).
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Kentucky affirmed both convictions.24
Watkins then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. 25
The district court dismissed the petition after the State moved for sum-
mary judgment.26
The other situation involved a rape in Jefferson County, Ken-
tucky.2 7 Shortly after midnight on July 21, 1974,28 the victim was
forced into a car by two men, driven to an isolated area, and raped by
one of the men.29 The next day, the victim reported the incident to the
police, and gave a verbal description of her assailant. 30 She looked
through volumes of mug shots in an attempt to identify her assailant,
and after viewing over 1200 photographs, she positively identified a
photograph of Summitt as her assailant.31
Prior to trial, Summitt's attorney moved to suppress any in-court
identification by the victim, and requested a hearing out of the jury's
presence to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence.
The motion and request were denied.32 At trial, both the pretrial and
in-court identifications were admitted into evidence.33 The jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty, and Summitt was sentenced to life
24 Watkins v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1978).
25 Watkins v. Bordenkircher, No. C78-0241 L(A). Watkins claimed that the failure of the
trial court to grant him an in camera hearing on the admissibility of the identification evi-
dence denied him a fair trial in accordance with due process. He also claimed that the identi-
fication procedures used were impermissibly suggestive, and that the prosecutor had made
prejudicial remarks in his closing statement to the jury, which denied him a fair trial.
26 On the suppression hearing issue, the federal district court relied upon rulings of the
Kentucky Supreme Court which had held that such a hearing was not constitutionally re-
quired. Ray v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Ky. 1977); Watkins v. Common-
wealth, 565 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1978).
The district court followed Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) in holding that the
hospital room identification by Goeing was not unnecessarily suggestive, and was, therefore,
admissible. It cited Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), to establish that Smith's identifica-
tion was admissible because it was reliable.
27 Summitt v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1977), aj'd sub nom, Summitt v.
Bordenkircher, No. C78-0165 L(B) (W.D. Ky., May 31 1978), afd, 608 F.2d 247 (6th Cir.
1979), afdsub nona, Watkins v. Sowaers, 101 S. Ct. 654 (1981).
28 Summitt v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d at 549.
29 The entire incident lasted about 45 minutes. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, No. C78-0165
L(B).
30 She described the rapist as a white male in his thirties, about five feet, nine inches tall,
180 pounds, with a rough complexion and tattoos on both arms. 608 F.2d at 249, 550 S.W.2d
at 549.
31 The Supreme Court of Kentucky reported that this identification was made within
twenty hours, 550 S.W.2d at 549, while the federal courts reported that it was made two days
after the victim started reviewing the photographs. 101 S. Ct. at 657; 608 F.2d at 249.




On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Summitt's
conviction.3 5 Summitt then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,3 6 but
the court denied the petition.3 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit combined
Watkin's and Summitt's appeals, and affirmed both district court judg-
ments.38 Although the court noted that it was preferable to hold a hear-
ing on the admissibility of identification evidence outside of the presence
of the jury,3 9 it held that such a proceeding was not constitutionally
mandated. 40 The court noted that due process only requires that the
trial court make an independent determination of the reliability of the
identification evidence after an adequate hearing.41 Finding that the
trial courts had met this requirement, the Sixth Circuit held that due
process had not been violated.42
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the refusals of the respective trial courts to conduct a hearing
on the admissibility of the identification evidence outside the presence of
the jury had violated the defendants' right to due process. 43
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court, in a 7 to 2 decision, affirmed the
lower courts' rulings and held that an out-of-court hearing on the admis-
sibility of the eyewitness identification evidence was not constitutionally
mandated.44 Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion and Justice
34 Summitt v. Bordenkircher, No. C78-0165 L(B).
35 Summitt v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 548. The court found that the victim's identi-
fication of Summitt had not been obtained through an improperly suggestive identification
technique, that it was reliable, and that the trial judge had not erred in refusing to conduct a
pretrial suppression hearing.
36 Summitt v. Bordenkircher, No. C78-0165 L(B).
37 Id The court found that the victim's identification of Summitt was reliable, and that
the refusal of the trial court to grant the requested hearing was not erroneous.
38 Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979).
39 Id at 250.
40 Id at 251.
41 Id The court applied Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), and Pinto v. Pierce, 389
U.S. 31 (1967), to identification evidence to reach this conclusion. The court found that since
the trial courts had before them all the facts concerning the reliability of the identification
evidence, and had made independent determinations that the identification evidence was
admissible, the defendants had had adequate hearings. 608 F.2d at 251.
42 Id
43 445 U.S. 962 (1980). The grant of certiorari was limited to the pretrial admissibility
hearing issue. Certiorari was denied on Watkins' claim that he did not receive a fair trial
because of prejudicial statements in the prosecutor's closing statement.
44 Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1981).
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Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Marshall.
Justice Stewart initially acknowledged that a hearing out of the
presence of the jury is the most prudent method of determining whether
identification evidence is admissible. 45 However, he correctly identified
the issue in this case as whether such a hearing is constitutionally re-
quired under the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 46
The defendants had argued that the hearing on the admissibility of
eyewitness identification evidence must occur outside the presence of the
jury.47 They attempted to analogize their situation toJackson v. Denno ,48
in which the Court struck down as unconstitutional a New York proce-
dure in which the voluntariness of a confession was determined by the
trial jury.49 The defendants in Watkins argued that Jackson had estab-
lished a per se due process right to a preliminary determination of vol-
untariness outside the presence of the trial jury.50 They then attempted
to show that the considerations which led to the per se rule in Jackson
applied equally to the determination of the admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence.51
The Watkins majority found that the special considerations which
led to the Jackson rule for confession evidence did not apply to eyeWit-
ness identification evidence. Jackson had created an exception to the
usual presumption that juries will follow the trial judge's instructions.5 2
TheJackson Court feared that juries would not be able to disregard relia-
ble yet inadmissible' confessions.53 The Watkins majority distinguished
45 Id at 657.
46 ,,. . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.. ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47 Id at 658; see also Petitioner's Brief at 15, Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. 654 (1981).
48 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
49 Id at 391. Actually, under the New York procedure the judge made the initial deter-
mination of voluntariness. If he found the confession to be unquestionably involuntary, he
was not to admit it into evidence. However, if he found the voluntariness to be a "fair ques-
tion," he was to leave the final determination of voluntariness to thejury. 378 U.S. at 377-78.
The judge was not required to exclude the jury from the presentation of evidence for this
preliminary determination. Id at n.7.
50 TheJacson Court never explicitly held that the jury must be excluded from the presen-
tation of evidence on the voluntariness of the confession before the judge's initial determina-
tion of admissibility. See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 (1967). However, one of the major
considerations which led to theJadson decision was the Court's fear that the jury would be
unable to completely disregard confession evidence if it was found to be involuntary and thus
inadmissible. 378 U.S. at 388-89. See also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 151 (1954);
United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951). The Watkins Court assumed arguendo
thatJackson had established a per se right to a voluntariness hearing outside of the presence of
the jury. 101 S. Ct. at 658.
51 See Petitioner's Brief at 30-33, Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. 654 (1981).
52 See Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. at 658.
53 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 381-82. Regardless of their truth, involuntary confes-
sions are not admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution both because they tend to be
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Jackson by noting that identification evidence is always admissible if reli-
able.54 (This presumes that the defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel has not been violated by the identification procedure.55) Since
the jury is not required to ignore reliable identification evidence, Justice
Stewart concluded that the special considerations ofJackson are inappli-
cable to identification evidence.56
The petitioners next argued that cross-examination would be an
ineffective means of exposing unreliability in eyewitness identification
evidence. 57 The petitioners relied upon a passage from United States v.
Wade58 maintaining that, by dwelling upon the subject, cross-examina-
tion might actually make a questionable identification more reliable in
the minds of the jury.59 As a result, defense attorneys might be reluctant
to use intensive cross-examination to discredit the reliability of an eye-
witness identification.60 Therefore, many questionable identifications
would go to the jury without sufficient demonstration of their unreliabil-
ity. If, however, the evidence of the unreliability of the identification
could be presented at a hearing away from the jury, defense counsel
would not need to be overcautious in exploring the circumstances of the
identification.
The Court noted that cross-examination always creates risk for a
defendant. 61 It dismissed the quoted passage from Wade as concerning
only the defendant's right to the suppression of an in-court identification
unreliable, and because the integrity of the courts would be tarnished if such confessions were
admitted. Id at 385-86. TheJackson Court feared that juries would not grasp the significance
of these policies, and would use evidence of any reliable confession in assessing the guilt of the
accused, regardless of how the confession was obtained. Id at 381-82. For example, it is
doubtful that a jury would ignore a statement, obtained by police coercion, which contained
incriminating details only the true culprit would know. See id at 388.
54 101 S. Ct. at 658. See also Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 113-14, Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. at 198.
55 See note 62 infia.
56 The Court found that often the jury's sole duty in cases involving eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence is to judge the reliability of that evidence. 101 S. Ct. at 658. Obviously, the
jury would not be required to ignore reliable identification evidence. Therefore, Jackson's
questioning of the ability of the jury to ignore reliable confession evidence is inapplicable to
identification evidence.
57 Id at 659.
58 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Wade established the right to counsel at post-indictment lineups.
59 The quoted passage from Wade is:
the predicament in which Wade's counsel found himself-realizing that possible unfair-
ness at the lineup may be the sole means of attack upon the unequivocal courtroom
identification, and having to probe in the dark in an attempt to discover and reveal
unfairness, while bolstering the government witness' courtroom identification by bring-
ing out and dwelling upon his prior identification.
388 U.S. at 240-41.
60 101 U.S. at 659; See also Petitioner's Brief at 24-27.
61 101 U.S. at 659.
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resulting from a lineup held in the absence of the defendant's attorney.62
The majority added that a cross-examining attorney is always in a "pre-
dicament" when he asks a witness a question which may yield a response
unfavorable to his client. 63 Since cross-examination has historically
been considered one of the most effective means of ascertaining the
truth,64 the Court found it to be the device best suited to testing the
reliability of identification testimony.65
In his dissent, Justice Brennan first emphasized the unreliability of
identification evidence. He quoted a passage from Manson v.
Brai/ hwaite66 which observed that "[u]sually the witness must testify
about an encounter with a total stranger under circumstances of emer-
gency or emotional stress. The witness' recollection of the stranger can
be distorted easily by the circumstances or by later actions of the po-
lice."'67 Justice Brennan found that these characteristics made all identi-
fication evidence suspect, and had caused the Court to mandate
safeguards to ensure that the jury's decision-making process was not im-
paired by the introduction of unreliable identification evidence.68
Justice Brennan then attacked the effectiveness of an instruction to
62 Id See aso Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. at 239-42. Holding a post-indictment
lineup in the absence of the defendant's attorney is the identification procedure which Wade
prohibited. What the Wade court was discussing in the quoted passage (see note 59 swpra) was
the ineffectiveness of cross-examination in exposing the unreliability of an in-court identifica-
tion due to a prior suggestive lineup. The Wakins majority implied that its decision would
not apply to such evidence. 101 S. Ct. at 659.
The rule in Watkins will probably not apply to the admissibility of evidence of out of
court post-indictment lineups held in the absence of the defendant's attorney. This is because
such identification evidence is inadmissible regardless of its reliability. Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. at 272; see a/so Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 298-99. Wati/z probably will apply,
however, to the admissibility of in-court identifications which may have been tainted by prior
Wade-violative lineups. Although technically the test for the admissibility of such an in-court
identification is a "taint" test, 388 U.S. at 241 (applying Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963)), and not a reliability test, in practice the two tests are identical. Compare Wade v.
United States, 388 U.S. at 241, with Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 114. Therefore,
Watkins will probably apply to the situation considered in the quoted passage from Wade.
The Watkins Court's out-of-hand dismissal of this passage seems unjustified.
The Watkins Court could have distinguished the quoted passage by explaining that it
concerned a taint test, and not a reliability test. In order to do so, however, it would have to
hold that the two tests are different, and that some in-court identifications subsequent to a
Wade-violative lineup would be inadmissible, despite being reliable. Not only would this
argument seem to contradict the substance of the two tests, it seems quite unlikely that the
present Supreme Court would expand the circumstances under which reliable identification
evidence must be kept from the jury. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.
63 101 S. Ct. at 659.
64 See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974). But see Watkins v.
Sowders, 101 S. Ct. at 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 101 S. Ct. at 659.
66 432 U.S. 98 (1972).
67 101 S. Ct. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Manson, 432 U.S. at 112).
68 101 S. Ct. at 660-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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disregard, since such an instruction was all that would now stand be-
tween unreliable identification evidence and the jury. He concluded
that an instruction was insufficient to ensure that the jury would disre-
gard unreliable identification testimony.69 He recognized that the pow-
erful impact identification evidence has upon jurors may not always be
related to its reliability. He cited several studies which found that
"there is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes
the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says 'That's the one!' ",70
Due to the power of such testimony, an admonition from the judge to
ignore it may not have much effect upon the jury.
Justice Brennan found that the impact of eyewitness identification
evidence is not always related to its reliability. He pointed out that one
of the major factors in the credibility of identification testimony is the
witness' level of confidence, which is not necessarily related to the relia-
bility of his testimony. 71 He also noted that when the witness is also the
victim of the crime, as in both Watkins and Summitt, his understandable
feelings of outrage at what was done to him may lead him to make sure
that someone is punished. 72 This emotional reaction can lead to hasty
identifications that the victim is unlikely to retract.73 Justice Brennan
concluded that identifications by victims are likely to be both more con-
vincing and less reliable than other identification evidence.74
The dissent found Jackson directly applicable to the admission of
identification evidence. Justice Brennan said that identification evi-
dence can be just as unreliable as coerced confession evidence. 75 He
observed that allowing the police to conduct identification confronta-
tions in a suggestive manner was just as repugnant to the ideals of a
democratic society as allowing them to coerce confessions. 76 Finally, he
found that an instruction to disregard was just as ineffective in ensuring
that the jury did not consider unreliable identification evidence as it was
to ensure that the jury did not consider coerced confession evidence.77
69 Id at 663.
70 Id at 661 (quoting from E. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)) (Justice Bren-
nan's italics). See also the other studies cited by Justice Brennan in 101 S. Ct. at 661 n.3.
71 IA at 661. The Court has previously used the level of confidence of the witness in
assessing the reliability of an identification. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. This would,
however, seem to be as much a function of the personality of the witness as an indication of
the reliability of his identification.
72 The Wade Court said that "[l]ineups are prevalent in rape and robbery prosecutions
and present a particular hazard that the victim's understandable outrage may excite vengeful
or spiteful motives." 388 U.S. at 230.
73 Id at 229.
74 Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. at 663 n. 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75 Id at 662.




He therefore concluded that a hearing out of the jury's presence should
be required to determine the admissibility of all identification evidence,
before it is heard by the jury.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF WATKINS
The main effect of the Watkins decision will be the increased expo-
sure of the jury to totally unreliable identification evidence. Before Wat-
kins, a hearing would be held away from the jury to determine whether
the identification evidence was admissible;78 only identification evidence
which was arguably reliable could be presented to the jury.79 Watkins
has dispensed with the need for such a hearing.80 The jury can now
hear all identification evidence, no matter how unreliable, unless that
evidence is per se inadmissible under Gilbert v. Califrnia.8 1 This deprives
the prior Supreme Court protections in this area of having any mean-
ingful effect.82 Although dispensing with the preliminary hearing will
save some time, this advantage is greatly overshadowed by the prejudi-
cial effect of allowing the jury to hear such unreliable evidence.
Before Watkins, the jury would not hear identification evidence
which lacked "aspects of reliability. '8 3 Stovall v. Denno was the first
Supreme Court case85 to declare that a defendant would be denied due
process if convicted on pretrial identification evidence which resulted
from unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures.8 6 A year later,
in Simmons v. United States87 the Court found that an in-court identifica-
tion could violate due process if it was the direct product of unnecessa-
78 Se C. WHITEBREAD, sura note 3, at 361.
79 Se Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). In Foster, identification evidence was
found inadmissible because the procedures used "made it all but inevitable that [the witness]
... would identify petitioner whether or not he was in fact 'the man'." Id at 443. Foster is
the only case where the Supreme Court has found identification evidence to be inadmissible
because it was unreliable. See notes 102-06 & accompanying text infra.
80 101 S. Ct. at 659.
81 388 U.S. 251 (1967). See note 62 sup ra.
82 See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 112: "Wade and its companion cases reflect the
concern that thejwy not hear eyewitness identification testimony unless that evidence has as-
pects of reliability" (emphasis added).
83 Id
84 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
85 The Fourth Circuit had reached the same conclusion as Stovall a year earlier, in Palmer
v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
86 388 U.S. at 301-02. The Court established a "totality of the circumstances" test to
determine whether such evidence should be admitted. Id at 302.
Stovall's due process claim was eventually rejected by the Court. He had been identified
at a hospital room showup where he was the only black person present. The Court found this
procedure suggestive, but found that it was the best procedure available under the circum-
stances. There had been some doubt whether the sole witness would survive long enough to
make an identification under less suggestive circumstances.
87 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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rily suggestive identification procedures.88 In these cases, the Court
emphasized the suggestiveness of the procedure used and the necessity of
using that procedure in determining whether identification evidence
was admissible. 89 If the identification was the result of unnecessarily
suggestive procedures, the use of that evidence at trial would violate the
defendant's due process rights.9o
It was not until Neil v. Biggers9t and Manson v. Braithwaite,92 how-
ever, that the Court established clear guidelines as to what eyewitness
identification evidence violates due process. Biggers held that reliability
was the standard for the admissibility of both pretrial and in-court iden-
tification evidence.93 Bigiers applied the test originally formulated in
Simmons for in-court identification evidence to pretrial identification evi-
dence. 94 Thus, an inadmissible pretrial identification had to be con-
ducted under such circumstances as to create "a very substantial
likelihood of misidentification" 95 while a subsequent in-court identifica-
tion had to be tainted by a pretrial identification creating "a very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" to be inadmissible. 96
88 Id at 384. The Simmons Court stated the rule that "convictions based on eyewitness
identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on
that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive
as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id See also
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 5 (1970).
89 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 384-85; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 302.
90 Two later cases which applied these rules were Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440
(1969), and Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
In Foster the Court reversed and remanded a conviction for robbery. The prosecution
had introduced evidence of a witness' pretrial identification, and used the same witness to
identify the defendant in court. The Supreme Court found the pretrial identification evi-
dence inadmissible, because the witness had failed to identify the defendant at an earlier
lineup and showup. It was not until a second lineup, where the defendant was the only
participant who had also been in the first lineup, that the witness identified the defendant.
The Court found this procedure so suggestive that it was "all but inevitable" that the witness
would identify this suspect. Id at 443. It is worth noting that Foster is the only case where the
Supreme Court has reversed a conviction because of a suggestive identification procedure. See
also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977), where a suggestive identification procedure was an
alternate ground for the Court's reversal.
In Coleman, the Court found that a lineup identification did not fatally taint the reliabil-
ity of an in-court identification. The witness had spontaneously identified the suspects before
the lineup procedure had formally begun. There was some question as to whether the de-
fendants were singled out to speak the words uttered by the criminals at the scene of the
crime, but the Court found that the trial court could have reasonably found that the witness
had identified the defendants before they spoke. 399 U.S. at 6.
91 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
92 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
93 409 U.S. at 198-99.
94 Id at 198.
95 Id
96 Id (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 384) (emphasis added). Both tests
are based on the theory that the only due process interest to be protected is the defendant's
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Biggers, however, raised doubts as to whether evidence of suggestive
pretrial identifications which took place after the Stovall decision would
need only to pass a reliability test, or if any evidence from an unnecessa-
rily suggestive pretrial identification would be per se inadmissible.97
Manson v. Braithwaite eliminated these doubts by applying the Biggers
reliability test to evidence from an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial
identification which was held after the Stovall decision. 98 The Manson
Court held that "reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissi-
bility of identification for both pre- and post-Stovall confrontations." 99
The Court maintained that some identification evidence would be ex-
cluded under its reliability test. 00 It found, however, that its rejection
of a per se exclusionary rule for suggestive identifications would lead to
increased preservation of probative evidence.101
The Court has always been quite lenient in admitting identification
evidence. The only case where identification evidence was held to be
inadmissible because of its unreliability is Foster v. Californa,102 where
right not to be convicted on the basis of a mistaken identification obtained through impermis-
sibly suggestive procedures. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99.
Justice Marshall did not participate in the Biggers decision. However, he strongly criti-
cized its holding in his dissent in Manson. 432 U.S. 118-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He
believed that Stovall had created a per se exclusionary rule for pretrial identifications con-
ducted under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances. Id at 120. In his view, the reliability of
a pretrial identification was irrelevant--the only question was whether the procedure used
was the least suggestive available under the circumstances. Id However, he agreed that Sim-
mons had created a reliability test for subsequent in-court identifications. Id at 121-22. Re-
garding this point, it is worth noting that neither Stovall nor Foster discussed the reliability of
the identification evidence in deciding whether the pretrial identification evidence was admis-
sible.
Of course, if the majority in Mansm had followed Justice Marshall's reasoning concern-
ing the irrelevance of reliability, Watkbzs would have had an opposite holding. Since some
identification evidence would be inadmissible although reliable,Jachson would have been di-
rectly applicable.
The majority holding in Biggers has also been criticized by several commentators. See,
e.g., Pulaski, Neil a Biggers: The Supreme Court Dimantles the Wade Tdlog6- Due Process Protec-
lion, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1097 (1974); Note, Manson v. Braithwaite, 11 AKRON L. REV. 461
(1978).
97 "Such a [per se] rule would have no place in the present case, since both the confronta-
tion and the trial preceded Stovall v. Denno, supra, when. we first gave notice that the sugges-
tiveness of confrontation procedures was anything other than a matter to be argued to the
jury." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
98 The Manson Court found that an identification procedure, although unnecessarily sug-
gestive, still could provide reliable evidence. 432 U.S. at 116. The identification was made
from a single photograph shown to the witness. Id at 101. The state offered no explanation
for its failure to use a less suggestive technique. Id at 102. The Court held that this identifi-
cation evidence was admissible. Id at 117.
99 Id at 114.
100 For the Court's discussion of the relative advantages of the reliability and per se exclu-
sionary rules, see 432 U.S. at 111-13.
101 Id at 112-13.
102 394 U.S. 440 (1969). See also note 90 supra.
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the Court found the identification inadmissible because the identifica-
tion was "all but inevitable under the circumstances."10 3 On the other
hand, identification evidence has been found to be admissible despite
uncontroverted suggestiveness in the procedures used. In Manson, a sin-
gle photograph of the defendant was shown to the witness, who had had
only a few minutes to view the criminal at the scene of the crime. 104
Both Biggers and Stovall involved showups, where the police simply
brought the suspect to the witness and asked the witness if he was the
man.105 All these identifications were found to be admissible despite
their questionable accuracy. From the facts in these cases it is apparent
that the Court has only found identification evidence inadmissible if it
was completely unreliable. 0 6
Through Watkins, the Court has allowed almost any identification
to reach the jury, regardless of its reliability. Watkins will apply to all
identification evidence except lineup identifications held in the absence
of the defendant's attorney, which are per se inadmissible under Gilbert v.
California.107 Except for these rare cases, 108 a hearing away from the
jury is not required to determine the admissibility of identification evi-
dence. Therefore, almost all identification evidence will be allowed to
make an impression upon the jury, regardless of its reliability.
The Watkins Court has practically destroyed the effectiveness of the
protections established by Stovall v. Denno 10 9 and the cases following it. 110
The Stovall line of cases held that unreliable identification evidence is
inadmissible to ensure that "thejug, not hear eyewitness testimony unless
that evidence has aspects of reliability." 11' Principles of due process pre-
vent totally unreliable identification evidence from being used to con-
vict.11 2 Under Watkins, however, the jury will still hear this evidence,
since there is no way to exclude it before it is introduced. Henceforth,
any identification evidence, no matter how unreliable, will be brought
103 394 U.S. at 443.
104 432 U.S. at 114.
105 See Nel v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 195; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 295.
106 The Court has also found identification evidence inadmissible because the defendant's
right to counsel has been violated. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 251 (1967). However, this
does not alter the fact that the Court has never found identification evidence inadmissible if it
was at least arguably reliable, despite suggestiveness in the procedures used.
107 Id
108 After Kiry, the police can easily avoid Wade's requirement that defense counsel be
present at a lineup by holding the lineup before the suspect has been arraigned. This is what
happened in Watkin.
109 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
110 Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Cole-
man v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).




before the jury, except that which is per se inadmissible under Gilbert.
The defendant's only protection against unreliable identification evi-
dence will be a demonstration of its unreliability, and in extreme cases,
an instruction to disregard. These are the same protections that defend-
ants had before Stovall.113
The Watkh's majority placed a great deal of confidence in the accu-
rate assessment of evidence by the jury. In most contexts and with most
types of evidence, a jury can accurately assess evidence and give it its
proper weight. Yet, as the Stovall and Jackson decisions recognized, the
jury's accuracy comes into question when it is asked to deal with evi-
dence which is highly persuasive yet contains hidden sources of unrelia-
bility.114 Nevertheless, the Watkins majority maintained that its decision
will not make any difference in the evidence the jury actually uses to
convict, because the jury is predisposed to ignore unreliable identifica-
tion testimony anyway.115 Moreover, cross-examination will place
before the jury all the evidence of the identification's unreliability. 116
Cross-examination can backfire on the defense, however. By dwell-
ing upon the identification, cross-examination can make the jury more
convinced of its importance. 117 Also, there is always the risk that cross-
examining a hostile witness will yield an unexpected answer which will
damage the defendant's case.1  In order to avoid these risks, many de-
fense attorneys will limit the length and scope of their cross-examina-
tion. A great deal of evidence on the unreliability of an identification
will not come out at trial. Therefore, many questionable identifications
will go to the jury without sufficient evidence of their unreliability.
Moreover, this deficiency will usually be indetectable on appeal.' 19
A separate hearing, away from the jury, on the admissibility of
identification evidence would avoid these risks. Since the jury would
not be present, defense counsel could probe the circumstances of the
identification as long as necessary, without worrying that he is reinforc-
ing the identification in the minds of the jury. Defense counsel could
ask questions which may yield an unfavorable response, without rein-
113 S e Nell v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199 ("Stovall v. Denno, supra, when we first gave notice
that the suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was anything other than a matter to be
argued to the jury"). Id
114 &e the discussion ofJackron at notes 48-56 & accompanying text supra, and the discus-
sion of Stovall at notes 83-86 & accompanying text sura.
115 e 101 S. Ct. at 658.
116 Id at 659.
117 Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. at 241. &e also the discussion at notes 59-62 & accom-
panying text supra.
118 101 S. Ct. at 659.
119 See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 659 ("The petitioners point to no specific instances in the trial
where their counsel were thus deterred [from cross-examining] ...').
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forcing the prosecution's case before the trier of fact. This hearing need
not be time consuming. As soon as the judge was satisfied that the iden-
tification had some "aspects of reliability," 120 he could rule it admissi-
ble. The extensive proof required at trial to determine the reliability of
the evidence would not be necessary at this preliminary hearing.
The Watkins majority also relied upon instructions to disregard to
ensure that juries would not use unreliable evidence to convict. 121 An
instruction to disregard may be ineffective for several reasons. First, be-
cause of the previously discussed limitations in cross-examination before
the jury,122 the judge may not hear all the evidence of the identifica-
tion's unreliability. Thus, instructions to disregard may not be given
because the judge has not been fully informed about the circumstances
of the identification. Moreover, instructions to disregard may not be
effective even if given. Identification evidence may appear more reliable
than it actually is, especially to the lay juror. 123 Even if the jury is told
to disregard the identification evidence, it may still make an impression
on the jurors' minds. Thus, the inadmissible evidence may influence the
jury's verdict despite an instruction to disregard. 124 Again, preventing
the jury from hearing identification evidence until it was determined to
be admissible would prevent this problem.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Watkins v. Sowders, has allowed almost any
identification evidence to come before the jury, regardless of its reliabil-
ity. This will result in many innocent defendants being convicted upon
totally unreliable evidence. The safeguards the Court proposes to pre-
vent this occurrence--cross-examination and instructions to disregard-
are not equal to the task placed upon them. The Court seemed more
impressed with the reliability of the identifications in this case than with
the future situations where identification evidence brought before the
jury is totally unreliable.
Watkins is an example of the Court's recent efforts to greatly reduce
the scope and applicability of exclusionary rules in criminal prosecu-
tions. Whatever the merits of this effort in general, the Court does not
seem to be weighing the costs and benefits of an exclusionary rule in
each situation. Identification evidence differs from, for example, the
fruits of an illegal search. Even under Justice Marshall's formulation of
the Stovall rule, pretrial identification evidence found to be per se inad-
120 Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.
121 101 S. Ct. at 658.
122 See notes 116-19 & accompanying text supra.
123 101 S. Ct. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 Id at 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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missible could be recreated under scrupulously fair circumstances. Un-
less the first, illegal, identification procedure had so tainted the witness'
memory as to make any subsequent identification totally unreliable, this
second identification would be admissible. However, the present Court
seems just as anxious to eliminate the exclusionary rule in this situation
as it is to eliminate it where it results in probative evidence being irre-
trievably lost. Watkins is another step in this process. It seems that only
a change in the composition of the Court will reverse this disturbing
trend.
ROBERT Roy SCHNEIDER
